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1 Introduction 
  
 Europe has been the mother of several human rights related thoughts or initiatives, and 
all (!) – completely or almost – continent wide, basically political international organizations 
deal with the protection of human rights. This could serve and served indeed as an example 
for other continents, and the transfer of European and universal values took place, but – partly 
according to the different social circumstances – other regional systems reach amazing and 
significant development in the field of human rights protection as well. Therefore, in this 
paper I treat the question of interaction between the European and Inter-American Courts of 
Human Rights.2 Some authors (e.g. A.A. Cançado Trindade) already talk about the 
development towards a new ius gentium, a procedure these tribunals contribute to. Research 
in this field is essential in order to determine which road human rights protection ought to or 
is going to take in the near future.  
Interaction – or cross-fertilization – between human rights tribunals this article deals 
with, is a very interesting development of international law. That the two European Courts, 
Luxembourg and Strasbourg refer to each other is self-evident in the meantime, and also 
essential for countries being members in both international organizations. That the regional 
human rights courts make references to certain achievements in the UN system, is more and 
more often now and not completely incomprehensible. Though the fact that regional systems 
on – admittedly similar, but surely not adequate, so – different conventional basis use the 
explicit quotation of each other’s jurisprudence in support of their own judgments, is a highly 
interesting and not at all evident phenomenon.  
In this paper I focus on the above mentioned quotations, inlaying them in a system, 
showing what are the fields where this cross-fertilization, so quasi transfer of values is the 
most apparent. I would like to emphasize that although the Inter-American system has been 
created after the European model, and Africa3 is eager to copy the positive results of these two 
and apply them for itself, so we could think that it is only Europe who contributed to this 
‘human rights civilization’ or transfer of values, it should be reminded that the other 
continents, especially the American one is worth making a second glance at. Although often 
occurs the complaint that universality of human rights would not even be possible, as it is 
only a European (or rather West-European) measure of imperialism, I am going to show 
clearly some of the achievements of the San José Court, delivering at the same time 
arguments on which achievements Strasbourg could pay more attention to, in order to further 
ameliorate Europe’s human rights protection. 
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2 Interaction in General 
 
Interaction and cross-fertilization of international fora, above all, tribunals dealing 
with human rights protection is not a new phenomenon. Although I have to agree that in most 
of the cases it is not deliberately constructed and applied, but rather occurrent,4 to find in 
international fora’s decisions reference to another forum’s jurisdiction or a part of that is a 
highly interesting phenomenon worth taking a glance at. Nevertheless, it is true that 
international jurisdiction in general is like the ‘secret science of the pontives’:5 the judges 
rarely explain their motives, the jurisprudence has the task to find the logic behind; and so do 
the international judges as to interaction as well. 
The European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter: ECtHR) cites often the jurisdiction 
of the Permanent Court of International Justice (hereinafter: PCIJ) and the International Court 
of Justice,6 and more and more often the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court for Human 
Rights (hereinafter: IACtHR), and the whole Inter-American system7 as well as the UN 
human rights protection system occurs in the judgments.8 The IACtHR equally refers to the 
judgments of the ECtHR,9 but the ICJ has quoted practically no other international forum until 
recently – except for the jurisprudence of the PCIJ which he regards as its own.10 In March 
2007 the judgment in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia has been delivered, and 
the ICJ made reference to the jurisprudence of the ICTY, the International Criminal Tribunal 
created in order to punish the crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia. 
    
  
3 Cross-fertilization: Strasbourg – San José 
 
A The regional systems11 
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 Europe has been the origin of many brilliant ideas concerning human rights protection. 
Nevertheless, in this article only the first one, the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed the 4th November 1950 (hereinafter: 
European Convention or ECHR) and especially its Court is going to be treated more in depth, 
as the within the frame of the Council of Europe signed and by now12 by 47 European states 
ratified European Convention has the incontestably significant role in the field of the 
protection of civil and political rights.   
 Before examining the transfer of values between Strasbourg and San José, some words 
on the Inter-American system as well (which is more complex than the European): the Inter-
American Commission of Human Rights (hereinafter: IACnHR) is an organ of both the in 
1948 (six months before the Universal Declaration!) in Bogota signed Declaration on the 
Rights and Duties of Man and the – after the model of Europe created – American Convention 
on Human Rights (hereinafter: American Convention or ACHR), signed in 1969 in San José. 
The latter has the IACtHR as its principle organ of control. Almost every American state is 
member of the Organization of American States and so of the Declaration as well as the 
IACnHR, less ratified the American Convention on Human Rights and even less accepted the 
jurisdiction of the Court: this equally weakens the American victims’ position. 
 The question treated in this chapter is something astonishing: interaction and transfer 
of values in human rights matters between different continents. The comparison of these two 
systems serves to determine what kind of interaction exists between Strasbourg and San José, 
and therefore what values are transferred from one continent to another. Partly, I also search 
the reasons for the differences and examine especially the achievements the Inter-American 
system affected or should affect the European with, in order to reach a better protection. I am 
equally going to enumerate the main fields where Europe’s value-transfer is clearly visible in 
the Inter-American jurisdiction.  
 In order to make this transfer visible, I am going to treat the following topics: interim 
measures as well as the situation of victims, and pick out one of the protected rights: the right 
to life. 
 
  
B  Interaction as to procedural questions 
 
 When treating the interaction between San José and Strasbourg in procedural 
questions, some facts of the European system have to be reminded of. Above all, in the 
European Convention’s system practically one procedure works: the individual petitions; the 
other two are the state versus state and the advisory opinions, but the first is really a small 
percentage (although some cases of this type were significant),13 and the latter has never been 
used so far. As the Inter-American system was created after the model of the European, the 
European Convention’s system’s actual control mechanism, i.e. the European system of the 
1960s served as a model. It means that the division of the tasks between the IACnHR and the 
IACtHR followed the concept of Strasbourg, but was of course adapted to the special 
circumstances of the American continent. That the individual petitions did not manage to gain 
a to the European comparable status before the IACtHR as they did in the meantime in 
Europe, is of course due to the different political situation and historical development. In 
compensation to the individuals’ smaller role, the advisory opinions are in the Inter-American 
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system of great significance, but the state versus state procedure is not popular in Latin-
America either.14  
 
1 Interim or provisional measures 
 
 Interim measures are a subject where the European human rights protection – and the 
ICJ’s15 – system was a model for the Inter-American one. Interim or provisional measures 
serve as prevention, mainly to prevent violation of Articles 2 and 3 ECHR16 respectively or – 
as the Rules of Procedure of the IACnHR says, to prevent irreparable harm to persons in 
general. And it is a topic where the IACtHR developed the law more than Europe did.17 When 
applying these interim measures, San José can look in Europe mainly at the cases against 
Turkey and Bulgaria, unfortunately the IACtHR itself has many occasions to use this.18 One 
of the most famous type of these cases is where the death penalty cannot be executed,19 such 
as in the Öcalan v. Turkey20 case in 1999, but in Latin-America other types of violations are in 
the focus, e.g. the numerous cases where special groups are affected: like the matter of the 
Peace Community of San José de Apartadó regarding Colombia (since 2000) or of Haitians 
and Dominicans of Haitian-origin in the Dominican Republic (since 2000). The president of 
the IACtHR (which is not a permanent working court as the ECtHR now) can order the 
provisional measures which are reinforced later on by the 7 member-tribunal, like it happened 
in the very famous Loayza Tamayo case21. These measures were inspired by the above 
mentioned jurisdiction of the ICJ, but it can be established that the practice of the IACtHR 
went much further than Europe’s or the ICJ’s. In the case of Mamatkulov and Askarov v. 
Turkey,22 the ECtHR even cites (a significant part of) the jurisdiction of the IACtHR and the 
rules of the IACnHR, in order to support its position against a state not fulfilling certain 
obligations.  
 
2 Transfer of values as to the victims23 
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able to solve it alone or with the active contribution of the parties (friendly settlement). To be 
able at all to start an international procedure, i.e. the jus standi position of the European 
victims is much stronger as the IACnHR – though its contribution to the settlement of 
problems is incontestable – does not have a comparable situation to the IACtHR. This is a 
value of the European system the Inter-American judges would welcome as well, nevertheless 
currently there is no political will to establish jus standi for the individuals. 
(b) Contrary and compared to Europe, in the Inter-American system the locus standi of 
the victims is much stronger.26 They have the right to participate at any stage of the 
procedure, make comments or just to be present, or even to mention articles of the ACHR the 
IACnHR ignored in his report when forwarded to the IACtHR.27 This is due to a change that 
happened in 2001 with the new Procedure Code of the IACtHR. It was necessary after that in 
the legendary case of El Amparo28 one of the judges started to ask directly the victims – 
without bothering on the procedure rules. In Europe – where there is a written and an oral part 
of the procedure (hearings), but the former is much more accentuated – the victims’ position 
is much weaker in this aspect29… 
(c) The results of the procedures mean the judgments, particularly the remedies provided 
for the victims in the judgments.30 Concerning the remedies, there exists a variegation which 
the IACtHR uses more than the ECtHR:31 pecuniary reparation,32 non-pecuniary reparation, 
moral compensation, fact-finding, social reconciliation, or more concretely: ‘obligaciones de 
hacer’, the obligation to do something (e.g. to solve the explosive social situation), building a 
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school for indigenous children, etc.33 In the Aloeboetoe case34 the IACtHR even ordered the 
establishment of a monetary fund for the victims. To name a street after the victim, to 
effectuate a public apology can also constitute a remedy. Europe, representing the concept 
that the state has to find out itself how to provide remedy,35 stays by the declaration of the 
injustice happened as an adequate moral indemnification; at the same time it is more 
favourable for the victims concerning the costs of the international procedure than the Inter-
American system. A revolutionary idea of the IACtHR is the so-called ‘project of life’ which 
pays exceptional attention to the victim and plays a part in the determination of the 
reparation.36 This is clearly an area where the solutions and the values connected with it 
should be transferred in the near future to Europe as well. 
 
 
C Interaction as to the matter – The right to life 
 
Among the various rights and freedoms protected by the two here relevant conventions 
I am going to focus on that part of the jurisdictions where the transfer of values, the 
interaction of the two tribunals became obvious or where such an interaction in the near future 
could help maintaining the level of human rights protection in Europe.  
 The right to life is a field San José – due to the special circumstances – had more 
possibility to deal with. As Strasbourg37 until the end of the 1980s did not really had to treat 
the question, it is quite obvious that later it paid attention to what the little sister, San José did. 
This reference became two-sided,38 i.e. the two courts refer to each other in this field, but, 
admittedly, the topic is much more elaborated in the jurisdiction of San José as they have met 
more variations of the violation of the right to life in the past years. 
Special cases in the Inter-American system are the so-called ‘forced disappearances’. 
Already the first case, the Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras39 (1988), disappearances in 
Honduras was the subject of the case of Godínez Cruz40 as well.41 This jurisdiction and its 
achievements were discussed in the complicated case of Kurt v. Turkey42. The – from the 
experienced Latin-America transferred logic – was helpful here, but actually the OAS and 
also another American relevant convention was taken into consideration. Furthermore, 
already in 1975 (the American Convention was not even in force) reference was made to the 
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Inter-American system (Golder v. United Kingdom)43. (And anything alike was completely 
forgotten in the case of Cyprus v. Turkey).44 
The IACtHR elaborated already in the above mentioned judgments the triple system45 
of state obligations which leads us to the interesting problematic of the continuing violation 
theory, another sign of the transfer of values (see below). However, and it is now another 
aspect of the right to life, one of the main values of the European continent, the prohibition of 
the death penalty could not have been transferred until now: the IACtHR denied the demand 
of the IACnHR in November 2005 to give an advisory opinion on the death penalty…46 Still, 
in the European case of Öcalan (mentioned above), Strasbourg has taken into consideration 
how the judges in San José deal with the problematic of the death penalty,47 and in VO v. 
France the IACtHR was even cited as to the rights of a foetus.48 
The establishment and consolidation of the continuing situation theory49 is – at least 
partly – due to interaction. As declared, above all, in the cases Moiwana Village v. Suriname50 
and Blake v. Guatemala51, the doctrine of ‘continuing violation’ is accepted52 and applied in 
the Inter-American system. It means that once the country accepted the jurisdiction of the 
Court, ‘any of its subsequent actions or inactions were subject to review, even if those actions 
arose out of an event that occurred prior to acceptance’.53  
In the Blake case Nicholas Chapman Blake, an American journalist was detained and 
killed by members of a Guatemalan ‘civil patrol’, a paramilitary group in March 1985, two 
years later his body was disinterred, burned and re-buried elsewhere in order to make 
evidence disappear. The family tried in vain to get information from the Guatemalan 
authorities for years, it was due to private deals with civil patrol leaders that they got enough 
information to find at last his remains in June 1992.54 In the meantime, in 1987, the state 
accepted the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. In the case of Blake, 
the Court found that the duty of the state to investigate is a continuing obligation, which 
persists until the remains of the disappeared person are found and the guilty have been 
prosecuted and punished.55 The theory is based explicitly or can be derived from the right to 
fair trial and the general provision binding the states to respect human rights.56 
In the Moiwana Village case, a rather recent decision of the IACtHR, object of the 
consideration was that ‘on November 29, 1986, members of the armed forces of Suriname 
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attacked the N’djuka Maroon village of Moiwana. State agents allegedly massacred over 40 
men, women and children, and razed the village to the ground’.57 In a year, there was a 
change in the political system, and a new, democratically elected government came to power, 
which – after ratifying the American Convention on Human Rights – recognized the 
IACtHR’s jurisdiction (in 1987). The same happened as in the Blake case: due to the 
continuing situation theory, the state was found guilty, not in the massacre, but in not having 
fulfilled ‘its obligation to investigate the facts of the case, as well as identify, prosecute, and 
punish the responsible parties’.58 
Already in the Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras case59 in 1988, in one of the first 
cases for the IACtHR, the Court established a breach of the American Convention as regard to 
the general duty to guarantee the protected rights.60 Ever since then – though not radically, but 
– it did not hesitate to interpret to some extent human rights in a manner that advances the 
victim’s aspect to that of the diplomacy. 
The Blake as well as the Moiwana Village cases are the extremely conformable 
examples for the continuing violation theory,61 both of them concerning states that accepted 
the jurisdiction of the Court after the mentioned terrific events had happened.62 This theory 
nevertheless enables the Court to stay within its competence, rejecting direct examination of 
events that happened prior to the recognition of the jurisdiction (principle of non-
retroactivity), but exercising de facto jurisdiction. If the state fails to investigate, it does not 
fulfil its obligation to ‘ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and full 
exercise of those rights and freedoms’ contained in the ACHR.63 As the IACtHR expressed 
itself, ‘in the case of a continuing or permanent violation, which begins before the acceptance 
of the Court’s jurisdiction and persists even after that acceptance, the Tribunal is competent to 
examine the actions and omissions occurring subsequent to the recognition of jurisdiction, as 
well as their respective effects’.64 Both in the Blake as well as in the Moiwana Village cases 
the state violated Blake’s family’s and respectively the survivors’ right to judicial protection65 
and a fair trial66. 
Although the most characteristic occurrence of this theory is the American continent, 
the system of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, we have to be aware that as Judge 
Cançado-Trindade has written in his separate opinion to the judgment Blake v. Guatemala, he 
observed the mentioned category occurring in some of the cases before the European Court of 
Human Rights67 in the 1960s, mainly in the field of detention, and uses this fact also as an 
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argument in his separate opinion.68 The general obligation to respect human rights is also 
present in Article 1 ECHR, they are quasi parallel dispositions (another clear sign of the 
transfer of values).  
As Cançado-Trindade emphasized: ‘the provisions of human rights treaties bind not 
only the governments (as commonly and mistakenly assumed), but, more than that, the States 
(all its powers, organs and agents); the time has come, accordingly, to give precision to the 
extent of the legislative and judicial obligations of the States Parties to human rights cases’.69 
This approach makes us think about whether the related results of the Inter-American system 
could get back to the European system.70 Taking into consideration also the time factor and 
the European legal traditions, the resuscitation of the theory in Strasbourg would only be of 
relevance for the last adhered some countries, where it can occur that the legislative and 
judicial obligations have not been completely fulfilled; or as to recently acknowledged rights 
(see additional protocols).71 
 The continuing violation theory is a way of thinking which has its origins in the 
European system, but was without doubt developed in the Inter-American system of human 
rights, especially in the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court, and therefore again a value 
transferred from one continent to another. 
 
 
4 Conclusions 
 
The role of the Inter-American and European Human Rights Tribunals is significant in 
the general development of international law, especially as to the evolution of human rights 
protection in universal level as well, due to the transfer of values between these tribunals. It is 
to hope that both will adopt furthermore from each other the progressive and sometimes 
revolutionary legal institutions, or simply the way of thinking. The broad acceptance of this 
interaction between regional tribunals is clearly shown in the mere fact that even the parties 
themselves cite the jurisdiction of the IACtHR in Europe (Akkum et al. v. Turkey);72 the great 
impact the interaction has on the European human rights protection is incontestable. And 
furthermore, it is very positive that in the field of international law, where there is actually no 
institutionalized coordination of the international fora, the latter take themselves the initiatives 
and pay attention to the jurisdiction of others. 
Such a cross-fertilization is not at all uncommon for authors who already talk about a 
new ius gentium.73 A ius gentium, which has as a basis the universality of at least certain 
rights and which is – so the logic – also clearly visible in the interaction of the international 
tribunals. As examined in this paper, the IACtHR has never been afraid of referring to the 
ECtHR, also in order to support its position, the latter takes more and more often into 
consideration what kind of solutions find the judges in San José. This results in a transfer of 
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values, logic and way of appreciation, and so in a more unified human rights protection 
worldwide. And it is even true when really, every continent has its special features and 
circumstances. 
With Christian Tomuschat’s words: ‘…the human rights idea has lost nothing of its 
original impetus… There is a growing awareness that human rights must be seen within the 
context of appropriate institutions. Human rights alone do not ensure the survival of human 
rights. They must be included in a network of institutions which are guided by the same 
philosophy… But it is clear… that human rights cannot be seen in isolation.’74 Agreeing with 
these words, we can conclude that the interaction and transfer of values the regional human 
rights tribunals effectuate is a process helping human rights not only to be strengthened in 
their own territory, but equally in a universal context. 
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